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Transparency and Public Participation in
the Federal Rulemaking Process:
Recommendations for the
New Administration*
Cary Coglianese†
Heather Kilmartin††
Evan Mendelson†††
Virtually every major aspect of contemporary life is affected by
government regulation. For good or ill, the administrative process affects the food people eat, the water they drink, and the air they
breathe. Economic activity depends on the appropriate regulation of
key sectors such as energy, communications, and transportation.
* This Article represents the authors’ efforts to summarize and synthesize the views of a
nonpartisan Task Force on Transparency and Public Participation, convened at the initiation of
OMB Watch, a Washington, D.C., advocacy organization, and chaired by Professor Coglianese.
This Article is a lightly copy-edited version of the Task Force report initially prepared by the
authors. CARY COGLIANESE, HEATHER KILMARTIN & EVAN MENDELSON, TRANSPARENCY AND
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN THE RULEMAKING PROCESS: A NONPARTISAN PRESIDENTIAL
TRANSITION TASK FORCE REPORT (2008), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/academics/
institutes/regulation/transparencyReport.pdf. That report was current as of July 2008, when it
was originally drafted and released during the lead-up to the presidential transition. The Task
Force completed its mandate at that time, so we have kept the Article virtually unchanged, even
though in the intervening period several of the Task Force recommendations have already been
implemented by the Obama Administration and at least one member of the Task Force (Beth
Noveck) has joined the administration to work on transparency and public participation. The
Article would not have been possible but for the willingness of Task Force members to give
generously of their time and insight. We thank them for their thoughtful deliberations and
detailed comments on this summary. Eric Dillalogue and Anna Gavin helped in preparation of
the manuscript, and OMB Watch provided financial support. However, the report on which this
Article is based was neither vetted nor approved by OMB Watch or the steering committee of its
regulatory reform project. Instead, the report was used to inform the project staff in its
preparation of materials and recommendations to the steering committee. This Article reflects
the perspectives that emerged from Task Force deliberations, but it does not necessarily
represent the views of all the Task Force members or the authors, or of the institutions with
which they are affiliated. It also should not be construed to represent a consensus statement or
shared set of findings or recommendations. We believe, however, that the ideas and
recommendations in this Article do represent their own, synthetic form of expert participation in
the rulemaking process and warrant respectful consideration.
† Associate Dean and Edward B. Shils Professor of Law and Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania Law School; Director, Penn Program on Regulation.
†† Law Clerk to Associate Justice William P. Robinson III of the Rhode Island Supreme
Court.
††† J.D., 2009, University of Pennsylvania Law School; A.B., 2006, Dartmouth College.
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Health care and prescription drugs, international trade and corporate
finance—the list of areas of social and economic activity affected by
regulation truly is a long one. Indeed, the degree to which people
enjoy important social and economic rights and experience equality of
opportunity depends in large part on regulation.
Given the importance of regulation, the process by which rules
are made has important implications for democratic values and the
advancement of overall social welfare. Although many legal requirements governing the administrative process originate in legislation
adopted by Congress, even more are created by administrative agencies themselves, headed by officials appointed by the President (with
Senate confirmation) who exercise authority delegated to them by
statute. As agency officials attempt to perform their roles as policymakers, they often interact with members of Congress and White
House officials. But they also regularly face difficult decisions about
whether and how to interact directly with a public that does not elect
them, yet is greatly affected by their decisions.
The Task Force on Transparency and Public Participation was created to provide advice suitable for the new presidential administration
in considering ways to improve the federal rulemaking process. The
Task Force was created under the auspices of the Advancing the Public Interest Through Regulatory Reform Project established by OMB
Watch, a Washington, D.C.-based organization interested in regulatory issues. The Task Force operated independently of OMB Watch,
and the Task Force consisted of experienced professionals from
outside OMB Watch with backgrounds in government service, business representation, nongovernmental organization advocacy, and
academe. During the Task Force’s meetings in Washington, D.C.,
members discussed the role of transparency and public participation
in the rulemaking process, specifically focusing on the ends that transparency and public participation serve. The meetings were geared toward developing a set of policy recommendations to bring the
rulemaking process closer to the ends of substantive quality and procedural legitimacy.
This Article summarizes the result of those Task Force discussions. Part I focuses on the goals of the rulemaking process and how
transparency and public participation fit within those goals. Part II
sets forth specific policy recommendations for the new presidential
administration. These recommendations are themselves organized
into three categories: transparency, public participation, and strategic
management.
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I. Transparency and Public Participation:
Tools to Improve Informal Rulemaking
Rulemaking procedures should aim to encourage decisions that
both are legitimate and achieve the best outcomes for society.1 The
quality of regulatory outcomes can be assessed against agencies’ statutory missions, as well as more broadly by asking whether specific decisions advance the overall welfare of society. To ensure legitimacy in
the rulemaking process, agency officials should arrive at their decisions in a fair and transparent manner, specifically by approaching a
regulatory problem with an open mind, taking into account all relevant interests, and arriving at well-reasoned decisions. In many cases,
rulemaking will advantage certain groups and individuals over others.
Still, those who end up “losing” should at least be able to understand
the decisions made by regulators and to feel that their interests were
treated fairly and respectfully.
A. How Transparency and Public Participation Can Advance
Rulemaking’s Quality and Legitimacy
How can the rulemaking process be designed to advance the twin
goals of legitimacy and quality in agency decisionmaking? This Section of the Article explores answers to this question. By transparency,
we mean the availability of, and ease of access by the public to, information held by the government, as well as the ability to observe or
become informed about regulatory decisionmaking. Transparency
also means that agency decisions are clearly articulated, the rationales
for these decisions are fully explained, and the evidence on which the
decisions are based is publicly accessible. By public participation, we
mean the involvement by citizens, small businesses, nongovernmental
organizations, trade associations, academics and other researchers,
and others outside of government in helping develop agency rules,
whether through the open comment process required by section
553(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”)2 or through
other participatory processes.
1 These twin goals have been long recognized. Cf. Roger C. Cramton, A Comment on
Trial-Type Hearings in Nuclear Power Plant Siting, 58 VA. L. REV. 585, 591–93 (1972) (arguing
that although administrative procedures serve as a means to achieve better substantive outcomes, the procedures should also aim to foster meaningful participation by the relevant parties,
accuracy in identifying issues to address, efficiency in resolving these issues, and acceptability of
the resolution “to the agency, the participants, and the general public”).
2

5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2006).
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Those seeking to reform the rulemaking process often treat transparency and public participation as ends in themselves, but we believe
that transparency and public participation are more usefully seen as
tools that can enhance regulators’ ability to achieve society’s goal of
high-quality and legitimate rules. Public participation promotes legitimacy by creating a sense of fairness in rulemaking. The popular notion of a fair process is one in which all interested citizens have the
ability to participate and to have an agency consider their interests
even-handedly. Transparency helps because an agency’s refusal to listen to relevant opinions is more likely to be detected in a transparent
system than in a closed system. Not surprisingly, public clamoring for
increased governmental transparency seems to peak in the wake of
concerns about governmental favoritism.
Transparency and public participation can also help facilitate
oversight of agencies by the democratically elected branches of the
government—and contribute to a more robust record for judicial review,3 the process through which judges exercise their authority to ensure that agency decisions comport with statutory mandates.
Transparency allows both the public and the other branches of government to assess whether agency decisions are in fact being made on the
grounds asserted for them and not on other, potentially improper,
grounds.
Not only will transparency and public participation inevitably
help to achieve democratic goals, but they also can help produce better, more informed policy decisions. Increased participation allows
agencies to obtain information that may help them better understand
how current policies could be improved and also how the public or
regulated parties would respond to a change in policy. Participation
can therefore help decisionmakers better foresee and appreciate the
impact of decisions they are contemplating. Additionally, a rule perceived as legitimate will likely produce increased compliance. Affected groups are more likely to comply—indeed, they may even find
it easier to comply—with a rule if they are allowed the opportunity to
provide meaningful input during the formation of the rule and to understand better the rationale underlying it.4
3 See E. Donald Elliott, Re-Inventing Rulemaking, 41 DUKE L.J. 1490, 1493 (1992) (“[The
notice-and-comment process] fulfills an important function—to compile a record for judicial review . . . .”).
4 Cf. Orly Lobel, Interlocking Regulatory and Industrial Relations: The Governance of
Workplace Safety, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 1071, 1089 (2005) (suggesting that decreased legitimacy in
agency rulemaking and paternalistic enforcement efforts can, in some instances, lead to increased resistance by regulated parties).
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Transparency contributes to the substantive goals of the rulemaking process by making information more readily available to more
people. Such increased public access to information enables better
public participation, which, in turn, produces the benefits discussed
above. When people have access to the information upon which an
agency relies, they can more meaningfully speak to the accuracy and
adequacy of the information and the conclusions that an agency
chooses to draw from that information. Better public comments
founded on better information should lead to better rules.
Increased access to the deliberative process within agencies—and
within other government entities charged with regulatory analysis—
may also improve the quality of participation by allowing people to
respond to an agency’s expressed goals, thoughts, or concerns. Transparency can also contribute to better substantive results by allowing
the public to act as an effective check on the regulatory system. When
the public monitors agency behavior, regulators are inclined to choose
policies that best advance the overall public welfare and the agency’s
statutory mandate; while under the microscope of public scrutiny, regulators are reluctant to choose policies that are sloppy or expedient.
Apart from its ability to pull the alarm on extreme forms of agency
wrongdoing, such as corruption, the public also can ensure that even
well-intentioned regulators do not stray from their statutory
mandates.
Still, improved transparency and public participation are not necessarily unmitigated goods. Even if increasing participation and transparency makes the rulemaking process and its resulting rules more
legitimate, too much transparency and public participation can very
well detract from making quality decisions in a timely manner. Increasing public participation requires an agency to expend more resources on filtering through and reading the comments submitted.5
These resources may be well spent to the extent that the additional
comments contribute to better policies, but many comments are likely
to be duplicative of earlier submissions. There may be, in other
words, an optimal level of participation beyond which the costs and
associated delays of dealing with public comments exceed the marginal benefits of processing them. For this reason, the quantitative level
of participation should not be given greater priority than the quality
and balance of participation. It is more important that the agency
5 See Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Costs of Mass Participation for Deliberative
Agency Decisionmaking, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 173, 224–25 (1997) (noting the high costs of information analysis for agency decisionmaking).
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hear from all distinct viewpoints than that it hear from large numbers
of individuals or groups expressing the same arguments or conveying
the same information. Although agencies should never prohibit or actively discourage public comments, they need not affirmatively seek to
expand participation for every rulemaking nor treat rulemaking as a
mere popularity contest based on the comments received.
Just as there may be such a thing as too much participation, total
transparency, too, may detract from the goal of high-quality decisionmaking. Regulators may not engage in full and open deliberations if
they know that the public, as well as the agency’s governmental overseers, could be monitoring everything said or written within the
agency.6 If regulatory officials feel inhibited, they may engage in
much less dissent, discussion, and self-criticism than necessary for
sound policymaking. Decisionmakers do need some protected space
in which to think critically and even ask “dumb” questions.
In addition to the possibility of inhibiting internal debate, a commitment to transparency could reduce the likelihood that private firms
would voluntarily provide agencies with potentially helpful information, especially if doing so were to mean that the agencies must disclose confidential business information obtained from such regulated
firms.7 Because rulemaking demands extensive gathering of information held by regulated firms, rulemakers need to strike a balance between the critical objective of letting the public know the full basis for
the agency’s decisions on the one hand, and the protection of confidential business information on the other.8 Although agency decisions
about the disclosure of information used to justify new rules should
generally adhere to a policy of full transparency, the presumption of
disclosure can be overcome where a sufficient need for confidential
6 See, e.g., Special Comm., Admin. Conference of the United States, Report and Recommendation by the Special Committee to Review the Government in the Sunshine Act, 49 ADMIN. L.
REV. 421, 421–22 (1997) (listing ways in which open-meeting requirements can inhibit the communications that occur at affected meetings).
7 See Cary Coglianese, Richard Zeckhauser & Edward Parson, Seeking Truth for Power:
Informational Strategy and Regulatory Policymaking, 89 MINN. L. REV. 277, 337–39 (2004).
8 Indeed, the Office of Information and Privacy (“OIP”), housed within the Justice Department, has noted that
[s]ociety’s strong interest in an open government can conflict with other fundamental societal values, “[including] . . . protecting sensitive business information . . . .”
Though tensions among these competing interests are characteristic of a democratic
society, their resolution lies in providing a workable scheme that encompasses, balances, and appropriately protects all interests—while placing primary emphasis on
the most responsible disclosure possible.
OFFICE OF INFO. & PRIVACY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT GUIDE
5–6 (2007) (footnotes omitted), available at http://www.justice.gov/oip/foia_guide07.htm.
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treatment of private information is established or where a statutory
requirement compels such treatment.
Finally, achieving transparency and providing meaningful opportunities for public participation are not entirely cost-free undertakings. They may lengthen the time and increase the resources agencies
need to reach decisions and issue rules. In some cases, additional time
and effort would be a good thing, at least if the alternative were for
the agency merely to make an expedient or otherwise erroneous decision. In designing processes to handle information and public participation, then, regulators are well advised not to let concern for
administrative efficiency completely trump the democratic and decisional advantages served by transparency and public participation.
B. Strengths and Weaknesses of the Existing Rulemaking Process
Once it is recognized that transparency and public participation
can both further and detract from regulatory goals, the question becomes one of how well the current rulemaking process is calibrated.
In other words, in what ways—and in what contexts—does the current
process allow either too much or too little transparency and
participation?
Compared to many other countries, the United States has long
had a relatively open and transparent rulemaking process. Following
procedures outlined in statutes such as the APA, the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”),9 and the Government in the Sunshine Act,10
agencies regularly make information available to the public and give
the public opportunities to comment on proposed rules. Additionally,
oversight of agency rulemaking has, over the past twenty-five years,
generally grown more transparent—the Office of Management and
Budget’s (“OMB”) review process is a prime example.11 The trend in
Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006).
Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552b (2006).
11 The Clinton administration adopted procedures intended to improve the transparency
of OMB’s review process, a process centered in OMB’s Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs (“OIRA”). See Steven Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical Investigation, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 821, 827–828 (2003) (noting that Executive Order 12,866
“required OIRA publicly to disclose information about communications between OIRA personnel and any person who is not employed by the executive branch, and to maintain a publicly
available communications log containing the status of all regulatory actions, a notation of all
written communications between OIRA personnel and outside parties, and the dates and names
of individuals participating in all substantive oral communications, including meetings and telephone conversations, between OIRA personnel and outside parties”). OIRA adopted additional changes in the subsequent Bush Administration. See Curtis W. Copeland, The Role of the
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in Federal Rulemaking, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
9

10
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recent years toward allowing members of the general public to access
information about the rulemaking process via the Internet is yet a further step in the direction of enhanced transparency.12 Still, the government can continue to improve its use of public participation and
transparency as tools for better rulemaking decisions. Without diminishing the positive aspects of, and recent improvements to, the regulatory system, Part II of this Article addresses how the government can
work toward these goals.
One complaint leveled at the current process is that agencies can
and should do a better job of listening to, and even soliciting, meaningful participation from all interests. This complaint can best be addressed by breaking it down into two distinct concerns. The first
concern is that the input agencies receive is not meaningful because by
the time the notice of proposed rulemaking (“NPRM”) is published
and the comment period begins the agency is highly unlikely to alter
its policy significantly.13 Many internal deliberations and policy discussions occur before an agency issues its NPRM, during a part of the
process that is least open and transparent.14 Also, case law interpreting the APA limits the ability of an agency to depart from the substance of an NPRM without initiating a second round of notice and
comment.15 If public participation does not affect an agency’s actual
1257, 1292 (2006) (noting that the OIRA Administrator in 2001 “published a memorandum to
OIRA staff on the office’s web site that extended [Executive Order 12,866’s] disclosure requirements” and announced that “OIRA would disclose substantive meetings and other contacts with
outside parties about a rule under review[,] . . . it would disclose substantive telephone calls with
outside parties that were initiated by the Administrator,” and “that it would be expanding its
web site [and] posting lists of regulations currently under review” (footnotes omitted)).
See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE PRESIMANAGEMENT AGENDA: FISCAL YEAR 2002, at 23–25 (2001), available at http://www.
whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2002/mgmt.pdf. See generally Cary Coglianese, E-Rulemaking:
Information Technology and the Regulatory Process, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 353 (2004) (explaining
how information technology has been applied to the rulemaking process).
12

DENT’S

13 See William F. West, Formal Procedures, Informal Processes, Accountability, and Responsiveness in Bureaucratic Policy Making: An Institutional Policy Analysis, 64 PUB. ADMIN.
REV. 66, 69–71 (2004).
14 Semiannual agendas, first required by an Executive order of President Carter, were
designed in part to address this problem. See Exec. Order No. 12,044, 43 Fed. Reg. 12,661 (Mar.
23, 1978) (providing that “agencies shall publish at least semiannually an agenda of significant
regulations under development or review” and that agencies “shall give the public an early and
meaningful opportunity to participate in the development of agency regulations”), revoked by
Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. pt. 127 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1988). Currently,
section 4 of Executive Order No. 12,866 contains a requirement that agencies prepare regulatory
agendas, Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, 51,738 (Sept. 30, 1993), as does section
3(a) of the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. § 602 (2006).
15

See, e.g., Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 116 F.3d 520, 530–31
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decisionmaking process because such participation occurs after rules
are already formulated, it is hard to see how it can significantly enhance either the quality or legitimacy of rulemaking.
Second, even when agencies do reach out to parts of the public at
meaningful stages in the process, they do not always do so in ways that
adequately involve all affected interests. Agency officials too often
hear mainly from politically popular or well-organized interests, which
may make up only a subset of the overall interests that will be affected
by many regulatory decisions.16 In this way, failure to hear from all
interests can detract from both the substantive and procedural goals
of rulemaking. Although it may be unlikely that an agency “forced”
to listen to a particular opinion will alter its policy as a result of that
opinion, allowing that viewpoint to be heard still furthers both the
reality and the perception of a fair process. Moreover, agencies that
do truly listen will learn more and consequently should be able to
make better decisions.
Another complaint about public participation is related to the
way in which the public comment process operates. The perception, if
not the reality, is that the comment process operates as a one-way
communication that does not facilitate an actual discussion or exchange of ideas, either between commenters and the agency, or
among commenters.17 Agencies may view public comment as a formality in the rulemaking process, at least partly because, as noted
above, many decisions have largely been made by the time agencies
solicit public commentary. Also, agencies generally share a mistaken
perception that interactions with external entities following the issuance of the NPRM constitute improper ex parte communications,
even though the courts have clarified that there is no inherent legal
bar to such contacts.18 In this regard, the institutionalized norms and
formal policies discouraging ex parte communications that developed
in the wake of the Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC decision arguably
(D.C. Cir. 1997) (finding that a regulation governing preshift inspection of mine ventilation was
not a logical outgrowth of proposed rule and thus required additional notice).
16 See Beth Simone Noveck, The Electronic Revolution in Rulemaking, 53 EMORY L.J. 433,
453 (2004) (“For the most part, each agency has a regular constituency of regulated parties and
inside-the-Beltway interest groups.”).
17 See id. at 435–36 (stating that interactive technology can help address rulemaking’s
“democratic deficit” by allowing for greater collaboration between government and citizens).
18 In Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977), the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit noted that although ex parte contacts made after the issuance of
a notice of proposed rulemaking were to be discouraged, such contacts were not per se impermissible. See id. at 57.
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have the unintentional side effect of suppressing outreach and thus
keeping regulators less informed of differing points of view.19 Similarly, because compliance with the Federal Advisory Committee Act
(“FACA”)20—enacted to ensure that Congress and the public receive
information about various groups advising, among others, the President21—may be costly and time intensive,22 agency lawyers also sometimes interpret FACA’s requirements conservatively to avoid
inadvertently triggering the Act. In other words, agency officials are
reluctant to meet with and engage in an ongoing dialogue with affected individuals and organizations, lest agencies be required to allocate resources toward FACA compliance.
As for transparency, some observers complain that agencies fail
to make information available to the public in a timely fashion and in
a manner that allows for its meaningful use, especially as a prerequisite for public participation. For example, important data might not
be included in a rulemaking docket until late in the comment process,
or the data might be buried in voluminous records that are not available electronically. The lack of meaningful access to important information detracts from the public’s ability to contribute to the
formulation of better rules. And the participation that does occur will
likely be less informed and therefore potentially less helpful or meaningful than it otherwise could be. The lack of information is a problem both for the average citizen and for the sophisticated “repeat
player” in the rulemaking process who is typically better able to overcome informational obstacles. A fairer process would give all parties
the opportunity to file meaningful and informed comments.
Another transparency-related complaint is that an agency’s stated
justification for a given policy too often represents a post-hoc rationalization for a rule that was actually based on other factors. To be sure,
some will question whether discovering an agency’s “true” motivations really is all that important.23 Perhaps an agency policy should
19 This potential barrier to communication is both unfortunate and unnecessary because
the D.C. Circuit has clarified that the holding in Home Box Office is limited to its facts and that
there is no “ex parte contacts doctrine” in informal rulemaking. See Sierra Club v. Costle, 657
F.2d 298, 402 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (noting that the D.C. Circuit has, in the past, “declined to apply
Home Box Office to informal rulemaking of the general policymaking sort” and referencing
United Steelworkers v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1215–19 (D.C. Cir. 1980), and Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458, 474–77 (D.C. Cir. 1977)).
20 Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1–16 (2006).
21 Steven P. Croley & William F. Funk, The Federal Advisory Committee Act and Good
Government, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 451, 452 (1997).
22 See id. at 493–502.
23 After all, the Supreme Court long ago held that “it [is] not the function of the court to
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simply stand on its own merits, and if a post-hoc rationalization provides sound reasoning for a sound policy, the actual motivation may
well be unimportant. Others could claim, however, that post-hoc rationalizations still can inhibit the ability of the public and the courts to
monitor the substantive goals of rulemaking by evaluating agency policy.24 The courts, and probably sometimes even the public and its legislative representatives, defer to agencies because the agencies have
specialized knowledge and expertise. Although deference to administrative agencies may be justified for other reasons, deference would
not be warranted on the basis of expertise when agencies do not rely
on expert judgment, but rather on other factors, such as political expediency. Furthermore, a post-hoc rationalization, to the extent that it
becomes detected, can detract from the perceived legitimacy of administrative rules. A process that is grounded upon an illusion will
only foster cynicism, not legitimacy.
II. Improving the Rulemaking Process:
Task Force Recommendations
Having defined the general manner in which transparency and
public participation can contribute to better and more legitimate
rules, and having considered complaints about the current rulemaking
process, we turn next to how the process can be improved. This Part
sets forth policy recommendations for advancing rulemaking’s dual
goals of quality and legitimacy while also addressing, in greater specificity, the current deficiencies in the process. The recommendations
below are organized into three sections: Transparency, Public Participation, and Strategic Management. The Transparency and Public Participation sections focus, respectively, on enhancing the availability of
government information and on effectively channeling public input
into the rulemaking process. The Strategic Management section suggests ways that agencies, or, more specifically, the new administration,
probe the mental processes” of administrators. Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 18 (1938);
see also United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 420, 422 (1941) (noting that “[i]t is not for us to
try to penetrate the precise course of the Secretary’s reasoning” and that “the integrity of the
administrative process must be . . . respected”).
24 In the context of litigation, the Supreme Court disfavors rationalizations developed by
an agency, or its attorneys, after an agency decision has been made, even if such rationalizations
would have been adequate to sustain the decision had they been announced contemporaneously
with it. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87 (1943) (noting that “[t]he grounds upon
which an administrative order must be judged are those upon which the record discloses that its
action was based”).
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can establish a framework for continuous evaluation of the implementation of transparency and public-participation policies.
A. Transparency
Information is essential to rulemaking, not only for agency officials to make good decisions, but also for the public to understand and
participate in the rulemaking process. To monitor an agency effectively and to contribute meaningful comments, the public needs access
to the information upon which the agency relies.
Access to such information is required both before and after the
issuance of a proposed rule. As noted above, much of an agency’s
decisionmaking can and does occur prior to both the agency’s publication of the NPRM and the opening of a public docket. Current docketing practices do not encompass all of the information needed to
ensure transparency and inform public participation during the time
when the agency reaches many of its crucial decisions. Taking steps to
increase the transparency of agency decisionmaking at every stage of
the rulemaking will enable the public and interested organizations to
contribute more meaningfully to the process. This Section of the Article, therefore, makes recommendations aimed at promoting the disclosure and improving the accessibility of agency information—
especially during the pre-NPRM period and during the notice-andcomment period that follows the issuance of the NPRM.
As discussed in Part I, not only does transparency contribute directly to increased quality and legitimacy in the rulemaking process—
primarily by allowing the public to monitor agencies—but it also contributes indirectly to these goals by allowing for more meaningful public participation. This Section’s recommendations focus, first, on
ensuring that the “correct” information is released to the public and,
second, on guaranteeing that this information is released at a time and
in a manner that allows for meaningful public access. By ensuring the
release of the right information in an accessible manner, the government takes important steps toward realizing the benefits of transparency in the rulemaking process. This Section also suggests ways in
which whistleblower protections can be enhanced so that, in the event
of failures in the general mechanisms of transparency, information
about problematic instances of agency decisionmaking can be
detected.
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1. Adopt Proactive Practices to Improve Public Access to Agency
Information
The Freedom of Information Act promotes government-wide
transparency by creating a presumption that information held by an
agency is releasable to the public.25 FOIA therefore represents a legislative acknowledgment of the benefits of transparency in the
rulemaking context: enhanced legitimacy of the rulemaking process
and improved quality of regulations. The statute, however, contains
nine exemptions,26 each of which can be read as recognition of the fact
that FOIA’s presumption of disclosure brings with it potentially harmful consequences—some of which we noted in Part I.A. Still, FOIA
makes plain that any document not covered by an exemption is available upon request.
Currently, most parties seeking agency records under FOIA must
submit a formal request (with the exception of some categories of
agency-controlled records that are statutorily required to be made
available automatically).27 The agency then determines whether to release the requested records or to invoke a statutory exemption. Requests for information are often delayed, either as a result of routine
disclosure procedures or agencies’ hesitancy to release information
(even when the information requested falls outside any FOIA exemptions). Although many requests for information are handled in a routine manner, sometimes even simple requests subject to the standard
FOIA disclosure procedures involve long and unnecessary delays.
The timely release of information is essential to meaningful public participation in agency rulemaking; consequently, the process by
which an agency decides what information to release could—and
should—be streamlined. The Electronic Freedom of Information Act
Amendments of 199628 already require that certain categories of documents be posted on agency Web sites.29 Accordingly, agencies should
publish, on their Web sites, any information that they, or the courts,
determine does not fall within a FOIA exemption. To enhance timely
access, such information should be made available without forcing the
25 See U.S. Dep’t of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 173 (1991) (“[FOIA’s] strong presumption
in favor of disclosure places the burden on the agency to justify the withholding of any requested
documents.”).
26 5 U.S.C. § 552b(c)(1)–(9) (2006).
27 See id. § 552(a)(1)–(3).
28 Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-231, 110
Stat. 3048 (amending 5 U.S.C. § 552).
29 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2).
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public to go through what would be, in instances where information
has already been released or determined to be releasable, a superfluous administrative procedure. Nevertheless, when an agency believes
in good faith that FOIA exempts the agency from disclosing requested
information, the agency can and should deny FOIA requests and, if
necessary, litigate the matter. If, however, the agency loses, the information should be made available not just to the requester, but to the
public (via the agency Web site) without others needing to file a request for it. Finally, it should go without saying that an agency should
make available all documents that fall within FOIA’s automatic disclosure provisions (currently, such automatic disclosures are not always made).
Agencies should also experiment with alternative procedures for
responding to standard FOIA requests in order to make the FOIA
disclosure process more efficient. For example, consistent with a presumption in favor of the prospective release of government information, agencies could preemptively label certain documents “exempt,”
“nonexempt,” or “uncertain” at the time of their creation. Documents deemed “nonexempt” could be made publicly available on the
agency’s Web site, while documents labeled “exempt” would require
the usual FOIA request.
Such a system could involve the use of a document management
system that would require an agency employee to specify the nature of
a document—nonexempt, exempt, or uncertain—upon saving that
document. The agency could then publish on the Internet those documents that have been labeled nonexempt. Such a system may have
the downside of requiring agencies to dedicate excessive resources to
making ex ante FOIA exemption determinations or of encouraging
agency officials simply to label everything “exempt” to avoid inadvertent disclosure of exempt materials. These potential drawbacks
should not necessarily stop agencies from experimenting with this, or
a similar, procedure. A more modest alternative would be simply to
create online, searchable repositories of all documents that agencies
have released in response to FOIA requests.
Although FOIA creates a presumption in favor of disclosure visà-vis all agency records, more targeted transparency policies that apply directly to the rulemaking process may further advance both the
legitimacy of final rules and the ability of commenters to improve the
quality of new rules. By way of example, section 307 of the Clean Air
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Act30 establishes a standard of transparency for Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) rulemaking dockets that other agencies
would do well to emulate.31
The Act requires that dockets for certain rules or other administrative actions undertaken by the EPA pursuant to the Clean Air Act
include “all written comments and documentary information,” “transcript[s] of public hearings,” and “[a]ll documents which become
available after the proposed rule has been published and which the
[EPA] Administrator determines are of central relevance to the
rulemaking.”32 Dockets must also include pre-NPRM drafts of proposed rules sent to OMB, in addition to drafts of final rules and comments exchanged between the EPA, OMB, and other agencies
reviewing the rules.33 Perhaps most important, rulemaking dockets
must be open to the public at certain specified times during each comment period.34
The docket-related practices observed by the EPA for air pollution rules deserve consideration by other agencies. The publishing of
documents of “central relevance” and of draft rules and comments to
and from OMB allows public access to the kind of information that
can enhance rulemaking quality and legitimacy. Improving docket
practices should help agencies address the problems identified in Part
I, specifically agencies’ failures to provide information at a time and in
a manner that allows interested parties to comment meaningfully. Although the next section of this Article elaborates on how information
should be released to the public, the necessary first step is to determine what should be released. The Clean Air Act provides an example of useful standards for this first step.
Recommendation T1. Agencies should streamline the FOIA
request process by publishing electronically not only (i) the
records that FOIA requires an agency to release without first
receiving a request, but also (ii) any documents that an
agency or court has previously determined not to fall within
a FOIA exemption.
• These efforts could include controlled experimentation with (i) a document-management system that would
involve agencies’ applying a FOIA classification to each
30
31
32
33
34

Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671 (2006).
For the Act’s docket requirements, see id. § 7607(d).
Id. § 7607(d)(4)(B)(i).
Id. § 7607(d)(4)(B)(ii).
Id. § 7607(d)(4)(A).
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document at the time of creation and releasing all documents for which there is no claimed exemption, or (ii)
online document repositories.
Recommendation T2. Agencies should adapt, as government-wide best practices for docket-related transparency,
the requirements of Clean Air Act § 307 that call for
promptly including in each rule’s docket, among other
records, all communications with OMB and other documents
of “central relevance.”
2. Effectively Manage the Release of Information to Ensure
Public Access
Once an agency determines that information should be—or is required to be—made available to the public, the agency should release
that information in ways that allow the public to access the information easily and use it to participate thoughtfully in the rulemaking process. Making information available in a form that the public cannot
easily use does little to advance the public interests served by transparency. Increasing openness, both by expanding rulemaking dockets
and by streamlining FOIA, contributes to a rule’s legitimacy, but improving the organization and “searchability” of agency information
would substantially improve the quality of public engagement in the
rulemaking process.
The need to strengthen the management and accessibility of information is evident in the context of so-called e-rulemaking—the application of information technology to the rulemaking process. Erulemaking dates back to the Clinton Administration.35 The Bush Administration implemented a government-wide e-rulemaking project as
part of its larger “E-government” initiative, seeking to use technology
to enhance public access to the rulemaking process.36 In 2003, the
Bush Administration launched Regulations.gov, a Web portal designed (1) to facilitate electronic filings of public comments on pro35 See, e.g., AL GORE, FROM RED TAPE TO RESULTS: CREATING A GOVERNMENT THAT
WORKS BETTER & COSTS LESS, REENGINEERING THROUGH INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 23–28
(1993), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/npr/library/reports/it03.html (recommending
development of integrated electronic access to government information and services); AL GORE,
FROM RED TAPE TO RESULTS: CREATING A GOVERNMENT THAT WORKS BETTER & COSTS
LESS, IMPROVING REGULATORY SYSTEMS 38–39 (1993), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.
edu/npr/library/reports/reg04.html (recommending steps to enhance public awareness and
participation).
36 See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note
12, at 23–25.
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posed regulations, and (2) to serve as a clearinghouse of information
stored in the Federal Docket Management System (“FDMS”). Although Regulations.gov makes rulemaking dockets accessible via the
Internet, it currently fails to function in a manner well suited to use by
the general public. The site is not nearly as user-friendly as technology now allows, as is evidenced by the greater usability of many commercial Web sites. More importantly, Regulations.gov does not
greatly enhance transparency in a way that facilitates public participation, thereby failing to achieve its aim: to improve rulemaking.
Improvement of Regulations.gov could be a useful starting point
for the new administration’s e-rulemaking initiatives. The focus of the
new administration should be on improving (1) the ease of access and
usability of the Regulations.gov interface, (2) the quality of data being
uploaded into FDMS, and (3) the timeliness of agency data entry into
FDMS.
Regulations.gov marks an important advance in rulemaking
transparency, but it still leaves significant room for improvement in all
three of these areas. Taking the first area as an example, the Web site
has minimal browsing capability and requires users to rely on its
search engine, which at present is woefully inadequate. The search
engine does not allow for easy identification of an unknown docket,
nor does it have sophisticated data mining capability. Although the
vast majority of visitors to Regulations.gov—both sophisticated users
and the general public—want to locate rulemaking dockets, search
tools seem primarily designed to retrieve unique documents from all
the materials in the FDMS, rather than to locate either entire dockets
or specific documents within dockets. The site has recently added a
full-text search engine that makes locating dockets somewhat easier,
provided users already have some idea of what they are looking for;
less-informed users (especially those who may not even know what a
“docket” is) are still unlikely to find the dockets relevant to their
interests.
Prior to implementation of the FDMS, many agencies administered their own online docket databases. Several agency Web sites
had useful features that have yet to be introduced on Regulations.gov.
For example, the EPA’s site allowed users to perform full-text
searches inside each docket. The EPA and Department of Transportation (“DOT”) also gave the public the ability to search an individual
docket for comments submitted by a particular organization. Both
search functions were extremely helpful to users.
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Moreover, recent advances in information technology offer government the opportunity to do much more, namely to integrate
databases and resources in ways that facilitate and simplify public access, particularly for less sophisticated users. Thus, for example,
rulemaking dockets on Regulations.gov could provide hyperlinks to
agency Web sites, relevant provisions in the Federal Register, and
other online resources. Information concerning the history of a rule,
back to the authorizing statute and past or related rules, could also be
cross-linked within the site.
The Task Force recommends that the new administration take
major steps to improve the search capability of Regulations.gov; even
users who are not sure of the particular docket or document for which
they are searching should nevertheless be able to find the most relevant materials. The new administration should also encourage agencies to enhance their own Web sites’ search capabilities and maintain
“major-rule” Web pages that link to Regulations.gov. The new administration should continue expansion of e-rulemaking capabilities,
especially in light of the enactment of the E-Government Act of
2002,37 which directs federal agencies to use information technologies
in adjudicatory and rulemaking proceedings.38
Improvements similar to those recommended with regard to erulemaking can and should be applied to agency records in general.
As noted above, a document that either the agency or a court has
declared to be nonexempt from public disclosure under FOIA should
be made available to the public via the agency’s Web site. In the same
way that agencies can create searchable dockets, they can and should
create document libraries and allow the public to browse records previously disclosed by the agency. Even documents that an agency does
not believe to be releasable could be referenced in citation entries in
the document library, thereby permitting requesters to challenge a
specific document’s status under FOIA without forcing the agency to
engage in a time-consuming search process.
One reason for FOIA delays is that requesters are forced to request records without knowing what documents actually exist in an
agency’s files; the agency must then determine how to respond to such
nonspecific requests. If agencies had easily searchable online libraries
of publicly available records, requesters would be able to access
agency information much more efficiently, and nonspecific or redun37 E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, 116 Stat. 2899 (2006) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 5, 10, 13, 31, 40, 41, and 44 U.S.C.).
38 See id. § 206, 116 Stat. at 2915–16.
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dant requests would be minimized. The agency would also presumably save the time and money associated with locating the requested
information.
Largely because of the difficulty associated with interacting with
agencies through the FOIA request process, it is often the more experienced nonprofit advocacy organizations—commonly referred to
as public interest groups—that attempt to gain access to agency
records. FOIA provides a fee exemption—often relied upon by organized groups—for requests made in the public interest.39 The
groups that repeatedly rely on this provision nevertheless must meet
the burden of establishing that they qualify for the exemption with
respect to each individual request. This arrangement creates conflicts
that are repetitive and wasteful, both for the government as well as for
outside organizations. The agencies and the public could be better
served if the new administration were to create a procedure whereby
established public interest groups could qualify for a permanent FOIA
fee exemption, or at least an exemption that remains in effect for a
specified period of time with an opportunity for renewal.
The obvious candidate to oversee agency implementation of
these FOIA reforms would be the new Office of Government Information Services (“OGIS”), created as part of the Openness Promotes
Effectiveness in our National Government Act of 2007.40 The Act
contemplates OGIS serving as a government-wide FOIA ombudsman
that would oversee agencies’ FOIA compliance and review agencies’
FOIA policies and procedures.41 The Act also provides that OGIS is
to be located “within the National Archives and Records Administration.”42 President Bush, however, recommended shifting the funding
for OGIS to the Department of Justice.43 Given the statute’s direc39 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(iii) (2006) (“Documents shall be furnished without any
charge or at a charge reduced below the fees established . . . if disclosure of the information is in
the public interest because it is likely to contribute significantly to public understanding of the
operations or activities of the government and is not primarily in the commercial interest of the
requester.”).
40 Openness Promotes Effectiveness in our National Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No.
110-175, § 10, 121 Stat. 2524, 2529–30 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(h)).
41 See id. (enumerating the obligations of the Office of Government Information
Services).
42 Id.
43 See Elizabeth Williamson, Is Ombudsman Already in Jeopardy? Bush Proposes Moving
Post from Archives to Justice Dept., WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 2008, at A17 (quoting White House
spokesman Tony Fratto as stating that “only the Department of Justice . . . is properly situated
and empowered to mediate issues between requestors and the federal government” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
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tive, moving OGIS from the National Archives and Records Administration to the Department of Justice would appear to contravene
Congress’s intent and could potentially frustrate the underlying purpose of OGIS.44 Although the Department of Justice has expertise in
FOIA matters, and some of OGIS’s contemplated functions overlap
with those currently provided by Justice’s Office of Information and
Privacy (“OIP”), locating OGIS within the Department of Justice
poses the risk that OGIS will be inadequately separated from those
responsible for litigating the government’s FOIA disputes. If OGIS
were placed in an adequately funded office within the National
Archives and Records Administration, the advisory and ombudsman
functions currently performed by OIP could be transferred to OGIS,
thus keeping FOIA coordination institutionally distinct from FOIA
litigation.
Recommendation T3. The new administration should improve the e-rulemaking system by focusing on (i) the ease of
access and usability of the Regulations.gov Web site, (ii) the
quality of data being uploaded, and (iii) the timeliness of
agency data entry into the Federal Docket Management
System.
Recommendation T4. Individual agencies should improve
search capabilities on their own Web sites and, for significant
rulemakings, create pages that hyperlink to Regulations.gov.
Recommendation T5. Agencies should create online FOIA
document libraries that allow the public to search and access
documents that the agency or a court has determined not to
be exempt from FOIA disclosure.
Recommendation T6. Agencies should create a procedure
by which public interest groups can qualify for a standing
FOIA fee exemption.
Recommendation T7. The Office of Government Information Services should be located in the National Archives and
Records Administration and should be tasked with overseeing FOIA reforms.
3. Ensure That the Public Can Properly Monitor Information
Disclosure
As discussed in Part I, transparency facilitates public monitoring
of agencies so as to encourage agency decisionmakers to exercise
44

See 154 CONG. REC. S1050–51 (daily ed. Feb. 14, 2008) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
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greater care in developing rules—and to avoid making decisions on
the basis of expediency or improper considerations. But this raises the
question: How can the public monitor agencies’ compliance with
transparency requirements? After all, many failures to comply with
transparency requirements will be nontransparent. If agencies fail to
abide by transparency-related policies, then the public will often be
unable to perform the monitoring that transparency generally
facilitates.
Perhaps the most promising solution to this problem lies in federal whistleblower statutes. Whistleblower protections provide an important means of bolstering transparency requirements and ensuring
the public is properly informed about agency decisionmaking.
Whistleblowers often reveal agency information that may have been
improperly withheld from public view, and they also uncover wrongdoing that the general public cannot readily detect. Because
whistleblowers have access to agency information that is beyond what
transparency rules like FOIA can provide to the general public, they
are in a unique position to monitor agency behavior. Provision of adequate and meaningful protection for whistleblowers is therefore an
important means of preserving the integrity of the rulemaking
process.
There are two major categories of whistleblowers—those employed by the federal government and those working in the private
sector. The Task Force focused mainly on the category of federal employees and concluded that federal whistleblowers need to be afforded better and more meaningful protections than they currently
receive. Specifically, the new administration should take steps to (1)
achieve timely processing of whistleblower complaints, (2) adjust the
burden of proof in whistleblower cases, and (3) strengthen protections
for whistleblowers who release information to Congress.
First, whistleblower-retaliation complainants are often bogged
down in administrative proceedings and may never have a timely opportunity to argue their cases before an independent administrator or
the judiciary. Where backlogs exist, agencies should create more
streamlined, independent, and expedited adjudicatory procedures for
addressing whistleblower-retaliation complaints. Whistleblowers
should receive an improved opportunity for timely hearings before an
impartial panel.
Second, Congress could also strengthen whistleblower protections by reevaluating the legal standards of proof in whistleblowercomplaint cases. Under the Notification and Federal Employee An-
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tidiscrimination and Retaliation Act,45 whistleblowers are generally
protected from reprisals for disclosure of information that the federal
employee “reasonably believes evidences . . . a violation of any law,
rule, or regulation, or . . . gross mismanagement, a gross waste of
funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to
public health or safety,” provided certain exceptions do not apply.46
Although the Act requires only an objectively reasonable belief of
agency wrongdoing, in practice this standard can appear to be a de
facto requirement of absolute certainty on the part of the
whistleblower.
Such a heightened standard can create an insurmountable obstacle for many whistleblowers because most of the relevant evidence
needed to prove whistleblower claims is controlled by agencies or
their administrators. The Task Force therefore recommends that evaluating tribunals adopt a reasonableness standard that takes into account the difficulties that whistleblowers face in gathering information
to substantiate their claims. This evidentiary standard should not be
interpreted in a way that effectively acts as a bar to adequate protection for legitimate whistleblowers—those with an objectively reasonable belief in unlawful government action. Nor, the Task Force
recommends, should there be a presumption in favor of any party in
whistleblower-retaliation complaints.
Third, and finally, there must be adequate protection provided
for lawful whistleblower disclosures. Congress should make clear that
the Lloyd-La Follette Act47 protects whistleblowers that make disclosures to Congress. Because channeling whistleblower disclosures directly to Congress is preferable to channeling disclosures to the media,
whistleblowers who do go to Congress should receive especially clear
protection against agency retaliation.
Several recent bills introduced in Congress would expand
whistleblower protection.48 At a minimum, when and if this legisla45 Notification and Federal Employee Antidiscrimination and Retaliation Act of 2002, 5
U.S.C. §§ 2301–2305 (2006).
46 Id. § 2302(b)(8).
47 Lloyd-La Follette Act, ch. 389, § 6, 37 Stat. 555 (1912) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 7211
(2006)).
48 The Federal Employee Protection of Disclosures Act would have clarified existing
whistleblower law and enhanced the protection for federal employee whistleblowers. See S. 274,
110th Cong. (2007). The Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2007, H.R. 985, 110th
Cong. (2007), would have refined whistleblower protections in response to decisions by the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit limiting the scope of disclosures protected under the
current law; it also would have provided specific whistleblower protections to federal workers
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tion passes into law, its implementation should be carefully monitored, ideally by a government entity that is independent of the
agencies to which the legislation applies. In addition, an appropriate
entity should also study the protections afforded whistleblowers in the
private sector, with an eye toward determining whether there should
be more uniformity between protections for public- and private-sector
whistleblowers.49 Like their counterparts in the public sector, privatesector whistleblowers can provide valuable information concerning
suboptimal agency behavior.50
Recommendation T8. Agencies should take necessary steps
to ensure streamlined, independent, and expedited reviews
of whistleblower-retaliation claims.
Recommendation T9. The adjudication of whistleblowerprotection claims should be governed by an “objective reasonableness” standard without a presumption of nonretaliation by the government.
Recommendation T10. Congress should confirm that the
Lloyd-La Follette Act covers government whistleblowers
that go to Congress with information.
Recommendation T11. The implementation of any new
whistleblower-protection policies passed by Congress should
be carefully monitored by a government-wide entity that is
independent from regulatory agencies.
B. Public Participation
Agencies need up-to-date and relevant information about the activities they are charged with regulating. Robust public participation
in the rulemaking process allows agencies to obtain information that
helps them (1) improve the quality of new regulations, (2) increase the
probability of compliance, and (3) create a more complete record for
judicial review.51 Public participation is also fundamentally linked to
who specialize in national security issues, federal contractor employees, and federal employees
who make disclosures regarding actions that threaten the integrity of federally funded research.
49 In the past, the Administrative Conference of the United States (“ACUS”) has fruitfully examined the issue of gaps in whistleblower protection, leading to recommendations that
were incorporated into amendments to the Whistleblower Protection Act. See, e.g., Federal Protection of Private Sector Health and Safety Whistleblowers (Recommendation 87-2), 1 C.F.R.
§ 305.87-2 (1993).
50 See Coglianese et al., supra note 7, at 299–300 (recounting how the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Food and Drug Administration promulgated rules after privatesector whistleblowers in the mutual fund and tobacco industries, respectively, came forward).
51 See supra Part I.A.
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concepts of legitimacy and fairness in agency rulemaking. Thus, reforms that improve the degree and quality of public participation in
the rulemaking process could contribute both to the creation of better
rules and to the promotion of the underlying democratic values implicated in the administrative process.
1. Promote the Multidirectional Flow of Information in the
Comment Process
Under standard notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures, the
comment period does not necessarily involve an exchange of ideas,
either among commenters or between commenters and government
officials. In especially controversial rulemakings, agencies receive
many comments representing extreme positions—sometimes with
both sides talking past each other. Because comments are one-shot
attempts at persuasion, commenters often file their comments on the
last day possible, for both practical and strategic reasons (namely, trying to have the last word). As a result, agencies are not infrequently
flooded with comments late in the public comment period and are left
to sift through them unassisted by the interested public. Sifting
through these comments and extracting the key information and arguments from them can be costly and time consuming. Further, due to
confusion about the rules governing so-called ex parte communications—discussed in Part II.B.2—regulators are too often unwilling to
solicit responses or clarification from commenters.
To enhance the value of public comments, the new administration
should encourage pilot experiments with interactive comment
processes.52 Interactive comment periods would appear to be most
appropriate for rulemakings in which (1) the issues involved are extremely technical or complex; (2) comments filed in the initial round
of commenting raise new or unanticipated issues; or (3) comments
filed in the initial round of commenting contain significantly conflicting data. In these rulemakings, agencies could usefully provide two
rounds of commenting to allow for interaction among commenters.
Persons who submit comments during the first round would be eligible to respond to opposing comments or to agency queries in the second round. This two-round approach would assist commenters and
the agency staff in evaluating underlying data, assessing arguments of52 The Task Force’s recommendations concerning interactive comment periods bear resemblance to a much earlier ACUS recommendation on this issue. See Procedures in Addition
to Notice and the Opportunity for Comment in Informal Rulemaking (Recommendation No. 763), 1 C.F.R. § 305.76-3 (1993).
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fered by others, and improving the quality of information available to
decisionmakers. Such a two-round approach also may well have a secondary effect of removing the strategic incentives to make extreme or
unsupported claims or to file last-minute commentary.
Although an interactive comment period could be somewhat
more time consuming than the current procedure, the gains in information and convenience for the agency may easily outweigh the costs
in some cases. The Task Force therefore recommends that interactive
comment periods be piloted on a small scale. To ensure that these
pilot programs can be properly evaluated, the design of the programs
must be carefully considered, especially with respect to the selection
of the rules for experimentation with this technique. For example,
agencies could randomly select rules for interactive rebuttal periods
from among the “significant” rules that are subject to the OMB review process. The Congressional Research Service, the Government
Accountability Office, or a reauthorized Administrative Conference
of the United States (“ACUS”)53 could be charged with monitoring
the results of these experiments, conducting careful empirical evaluation, and recommending future expansion of the pilot programs if they
prove successful.
Recommendation P1. The new administration should encourage agencies to experiment with interactive comment
processes.
Recommendation P2. Pilot programs implementing interactive comment periods should be designed to facilitate collection of empirical data concerning the impact and efficiency
of such processes, with the eventual goal of making recommendations about any permanent changes to the comment
process.
2. Encourage Transparent Agency Communications with External
Actors
Informal communications with external actors outside the comment process can provide agency decisionmakers with valuable information needed for rulemaking. Often these informal communications
are the most efficient means for agencies to gather and develop information for rulemaking.54 The communications are also the most diSee infra Part II.C.2.
See Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 400–01 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (“Under our system of
government, the very legitimacy of general policymaking performed by unelected administrators
depends in no small part upon the openness, accessibility, and amenability of these officials to
53
54
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rect means of public access to administrative officials. As such,
agencies should not discourage communications with external actors,
provided that agency staff members timely disclose their occurrence
and place an accurate summary of the topics discussed in the public
docket, and provided further that staff members remain open to evenhanded communication with a variety of relevant interests or groups.55
The new administration should strive to create an agency culture in
which administrators understand that communications with outsiders
during informal rulemaking are not only permitted, but are also beneficial if documented transparently.
As noted above, there appears to be widespread confusion across
agencies as to when communications with external actors are permissible.56 Regulators often fear that any contacts with such outsiders during informal rulemaking constitute prohibited ex parte
communications. This, in turn, leads to reticence on the part of
agency civil servants and general reluctance to discuss contemplated
agency activities. As a result, agency decisionmakers may tend to be
less than optimally informed and knowledgeable on topics of
regulation.
Anxieties over appropriate versus inappropriate communications
may begin to permeate agency culture to a degree that all communication is somewhat chilled. Thus, agency confusion on this issue not
only suppresses openness and outreach to interest groups, but may
even discourage open and frank discussion among civil servants within
the agency. The standards governing communications with external
actors should be clarified with the ultimate goal of making quality information more readily available to the agency decisionmaker, subject
to disclosure requirements.
the needs and ideas of the public from whom their ultimate authority derives, and upon whom
their commands must fall. . . . Informal contacts may enable the agency to win needed support
for its program, reduce future enforcement requirements by helping those regulated to anticipate and shape their plans for the future, and spur the provision of information which the agency
needs.” (footnote omitted)).
55 The Task Force’s recommendations on this point bear a close resemblance to recommendations made by the Administrative Conference of the United States in the mid-1970s. See
Ex Parte Communications in Informal Rulemaking Proceedings (Recommendation No. 77-3), 1
C.F.R. § 305.77-3 (1993) (“Agencies should experiment in appropriate situations with procedures designed to disclose oral communications from outside the agency of significant information or argument respecting the merits of proposed rules, made to agency personnel participating
in the decision on the proposed rule, by means of summaries promptly placed in the public file,
meetings which the public may attend, or other techniques appropriate to their circumstances.
To the extent that summaries are utilized they ordinarily should identify the source of the communications, but need not do so when the information or argument is cumulative.”).
56 See supra text accompanying notes 18–22.

950

The George Washington Law Review

[Vol. 77:924

In particular, agencies should be encouraged to elicit information
from a variety of external sources early in the process, even before the
development of a proposed rule, but also to disclose these early contacts when they have a significant impact on the development of the
proposed rule. As discussed above, the concepts and assumptions underpinning a rule are sometimes developed at a very early stage of the
rulemaking process and are difficult to rebut or dislodge later in the
process.57 Meetings between an agency and parties interested in a
rulemaking early in the process can have a significant influence on the
development of these assumptions and can often set the ultimate
course of the rulemaking. To enable effective public participation, it is
therefore important that agencies disclose contacts with interested
parties at every stage of a rule’s contemplation and development.
Agencies are already required by statute58 and Executive order59
to publish regulatory agendas and plans of new rules under development. By following the Task Force’s Recommendation T2 to create
regulatory dockets at the moment they begin the development of any
new rulemaking, agencies would provide an institutional forum for
disclosure of early communications with external actors. Although it
may be difficult to establish a bright-line rule for when the development of a new rulemaking begins, the agency should nevertheless attempt in good faith to disclose all pertinent rule-related contacts as
early in the process as possible. Such disclosures need not provide
verbatim or even highly detailed accounts of the communications between the agency and the interested parties. Rather, a simple disclosure that a contact occurred, a brief description of the topics
discussed, and a listing of all participating parties would enhance the
legitimacy of the process without adding any great burden to agency
staff.
Some agencies have already adopted such disclosure policies. For
example, the DOT now provides information on its Web site regard-

See supra text accompanying notes 13–15.
5 U.S.C. § 602 (2006) (requiring agencies to publish twice each year a regulatory agenda
of rules under development that are “likely to have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities”).
59 Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, 51,738 (Sept. 30, 1993), available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/eo12866/eo12866_amended_01-2007.pdf (requiring agencies
to “prepare an agenda of all regulations under development or review” and to create regulatory
plans “of the most important significant regulatory actions that the agency reasonably expects to
issue in proposed or final form” each year).
57
58
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ing the status of all significant DOT rulemakings.60 Recently, the EPA
adopted a policy of using “Action Initiation Lists” to notify the public
in near real-time about new rulemakings, even before the publication
of its regulatory agenda.61 Other agencies should be encouraged to
adopt similar policies. Regardless of the mechanism adopted, the ultimate goal should be improved transparency early in the regulatory
process, thus increasing the possibility of more effective public
participation.
As a complement, or as an alternative, to this type of transparency, agencies could take affirmative steps to ensure that more interest groups are given an opportunity to participate meaningfully in
the early stages of a rulemaking. As the public gains confidence that
the rule development process incorporates a true diversity of interests
and perspectives, it will likely view the rulemaking process as more
legitimate.
Today, as a general matter, the rulemaking process does not provide all interest groups—particularly those without significant funding
or legal representation—with sufficient access during the crucial, early
stages of rule development. Taking affirmative steps to involve the
public early in the process will therefore likely improve the integrity
of an agency’s decisionmaking. These affirmative steps may include
regional hearings, public evaluations of existing rules or gaps in rules,
and other forms of active solicitation of feedback from the public.
To provide sufficient public access, agencies should be able to
demonstrate, at a minimum, that they maintain a passive “open door”
policy or have adopted other mechanisms to ensure broad-based public involvement (e.g., technical assistance grants,62 ombudspersons, or
consumer advocates). Under “open door” policies, agencies that have
contact with some interest groups commit to making themselves available to all interest groups in an even-handed manner. Such policies
would be feasible to implement and quite effective if agencies adhered
to them faithfully.
60 U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., REPORT ON DOT SIGNIFICANT RULEMAKINGS, http://regs.dot.
gov/rulemakings/index.htm (last visited May 8, 2009).
61 U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Actions Initiated by Month, http://www.epa.gov/lawsregs/
search/ail.html (last visited May 8, 2009).
62 A Technical Assistance Grant provides nonprofit citizens’ groups with funding to hire
independent expert advisors to enable them to participate in regulatory decisions. Such grants
are sometimes used in complex, scientific regulatory actions such as in Superfund cleanup actions. See, e.g., U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Technical Assistance Grants, http://www.epa.gov/super
fund/community/tag/ (last visited May 8, 2009).
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In many cases, it may be difficult for agencies to hear from all the
individuals and organizations that will be affected by a new rule, especially in areas of regulation where there are few organized interest
groups. It may be necessary in such cases for the agency to appoint a
public-participation ombudsperson to speak on behalf of underrepresented persons and organizations.63 Alternatively, this responsibility could be delegated to a centralized agency or office tasked with
representing the interests of those underrepresented within, or with
limited access to, the rulemaking process.
Recommendation P3. The new administration should strive
to create an agency culture in which administrators understand that it is good practice to communicate with external
actors, so long as communications that have an impact on the
development of a proposed rule are disclosed in agency
dockets.
• Significant communications with external actors
should be documented even when those contacts occur
prior to the issuance of a notice of proposed rulemaking.
• Such disclosures need not be extremely detailed but
should contain information as to the identity and affiliation of the parties to the communication, as well as the
general topics discussed.
Recommendation P4. The standards governing communications with external actors should be expressly clarified to reduce confusion among administrators as to which
communications are proscribed and which should be
encouraged.
Recommendation P5. Agencies should be encouraged to
take affirmative steps to ensure that more external interest
groups are given an opportunity to participate meaningfully
in the early stages of a rulemaking.
• At a minimum, agencies should maintain an “open
door” policy, whereby agencies make themselves available for contact to all interest groups in an even-handed
manner.
63 See The Ombudsman in Federal Agencies (Recommendation 90-2), 1 C.F.R. § 305.90-2
(1993) (urging agencies with significant public interaction to consider establishing agency-wide
or program-specific ombudsmen and to set forth guidelines concerning powers, duties, qualifications, term, confidentiality, limitations on liability and judicial review, access to agency officials
and records, and outreach).
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• Alternatively, agencies should be encouraged to
adopt other mechanisms to ensure broad-based public
involvement.
Recommendation P6. Agencies should announce areas of
prospective rulemaking as early as possible and take steps to
involve all affected interests in the process of developing new
rules.
3. Reduce Barriers to the Use of Balanced Advisory Committees
When Useful and Appropriate
The Federal Advisory Committee Act64 governs when and how
agencies may consult with external actors through ongoing consultative panels. Advisory committees can be particularly useful in helping
to establish agency priorities and developing possible approaches to
rulemakings prior to publication of an NPRM. The requirements
FACA imposes on agencies, however, along with restrictions on the
use of advisory committees imposed by Executive Order 12,838 and
an array of GSA and OMB guidance documents, have significantly
curtailed or even inhibited agencies’ use of advisory committees.65
Procedural barriers to advisory-committee formation may tend to discourage their use, despite the fact that, when operating as intended,
such committees provide an excellent means of fostering diverse public participation. In fact, some of the requirements imposed on agency
use of advisory committees may well work at cross-purposes with the
objectives of legitimate and high-quality rulemaking. For example,
because FACA requires that certain kinds of ongoing agency contacts
with external actors comply with the procedural requirements in the
Act, agency staff may avoid seeking outside views simply out of fear
of triggering the requirements of FACA and prompting subsequent
litigation (so-called “FACA-phobia”).66 Procedural barriers and other
disincentives to the use of advisory committees should be reduced,
and agencies should be encouraged to use advisory committees whenever they would be useful and appropriate.
Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1–16 (2006).
Executive Order 12,838 mandates the elimination of a significant number of advisory
committees and requires OMB approval to establish new committees. See Exec. Order No.
12,838, 58 Fed. Reg. 8207, 8207 (Feb. 10, 1993).
66 See Oversight of the Federal Advisory Committee Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Gov’t Mgmt., Info., and Tech. of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform and Oversight, 105th Cong.
139–41 (1998) (testimony of J. Clarence Davies, Director, Center for Risk Management, Resources for the Future).
64
65
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Limitations on the formation of advisory committees can have
negative effects on public participation in the regulatory process.
FACA laudably requires agencies to balance committee membership
to ensure that a variety of perspectives are adequately represented—
including, in theory, critical or otherwise underrepresented perspectives.67 Agencies’ response to this balance requirement—and to other
procedural restrictions on the formation of committees—may be to
avoid creating new advisory committees altogether. As a result, perspectives that are absent or underrepresented in agencies’ deliberative
processes often remain so.
Instead of promoting diverse engagement with the public, FACA
and its related requirements pose the risk of inhibiting public participation. At a minimum, the new administration should eliminate the
formal and informal restrictions on the allowable number of discretionary advisory committees that have followed from Executive Order
12,838. In general, procedures governing the formation of advisory
committees should be simplified and streamlined. Agencies should be
permitted to make use of advisory committees when they deem appropriate. In this way, committees can help inform the development
of agency rulemaking. In addition, future GSA and OMB guidelines
should focus on clarifying and amplifying FACA’s requirements that
advisory committees be “fairly balanced” and should put procedures
in place to guarantee representation of diverse perspectives on advisory committees. Specifically, on committees charged with addressing
scientific or technical issues, FACA’s “fairly balanced” requirement
should be construed to require a balance of expert views, not political
interests.68
For the purpose of assessing standards for conflicts of interest and
biases, it may also be useful to distinguish between advisory committees composed strictly of independent experts and those composed of
representatives of affected interests. At present, all federal advisory
committees are potentially subject to the disclosure requirements of
the Ethics in Government Act of 1978.69 These requirements are (and
should be) drafted so as to establish more restrictive conflict-of-interSee 5 U.S.C. app. § 5(b)(2).
Cf. U.S. EPA SCI. ADVISORY BD., OVERVIEW OF THE PANEL FORMATION PROCESS AT
THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD 10 (2002) (“At the
SAB, a balanced panel is characterized by inclusion of the necessary domains of knowledge, the
relevant scientific perspectives . . . , and the collective breadth of experience to address the
charge adequately.”).
69 Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (codified in scattered sections of 2, 5, and 28 U.S.C.).
67
68
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est and bias standards for advisory committees comprising technical
experts.70 Under existing law, an expert advisory committee participant must disclose conflicts of interest and biases. Participants with
significant conflicts are generally disqualified from participation, although potential biases may appropriately be considered in seeking a
balanced committee.71 These same disclosure requirements and membership standards may not have such significant effects for self-consciously “political” advisory committees, composed of representatives
of affected interests.
As discussed in Part I, increased transparency can sometimes discourage candid internal discussion among regulators. The same is
true of advisory committees composed of technical experts. In light of
this concern, FACA already permits exemptions to its open-meeting
requirements for expert advisory committees in some agencies that
regularly deal with technical or scientific matters, specifically the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Public Administration.72 In general, expert advisory committees should have
sufficient privacy to allow them to deliberate more openly and candidly, and the new administration should consider which additional
committees would benefit from the opportunity to engage in nonpublic deliberations.
Recommendation P7. Procedural barriers to agency use of
advisory committees should be reduced, and agencies should
be encouraged to form advisory committees whenever useful
and appropriate.
Recommendation P8. The new administration should clarify
and amplify the Federal Advisory Committee Act’s requirement that advisory committees be “fairly balanced” and
should encourage agencies to adhere to existing standards to
ensure representation of diverse perspectives on advisory
committees.

70 For general ACUS recommendations regarding standards governing conflicts of interest, see Administrative Conference of the United States, Conflict-of-Interest Requirements for
Federal Advisory Committees (Recommendations 89-3), 1 C.F.R. § 305.89-3 (1993). A leading
example for expert bodies was published by the National Academies. See NAT’L ACADS., POLICY ON COMMITTEE COMPOSITION AND BALANCE AND CONFLICTS OF INTEREST FOR COMMITTEES USED IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF REPORTS (2003), available at http://www.national
academies.org/coi/bi-coi_form-0.pdf.
71 Craig S. Barrow & James W. Conrad Jr., Assessing the Reliability and Credibility of
Industry Science and Scientists, 114 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSPECTIVES 153, 155 (2006).
72 See 5 U.S.C. app. § 3(2)(c)(ii).
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Recommendation P9. The impact of conflict- or balance-ofinterest rules and public meeting requirements may appropriately vary depending on the nature of the committee. It
may be important for expert advisory committees to require
a balance of scientific positions as opposed to interests, and
to provide for nonpublic deliberations of certain expert
committees.
C. Strategic Management
The issues surrounding transparency and public participation in
the administrative process are numerous and ever evolving. This Article could not possibly respond to or anticipate all of these issues. A
number of institutional mechanisms exist, however, that could allow
the government to address the issues taken up here as well as issues
that are beyond the scope of this Article. This Section describes such
mechanisms and recommends that agencies further explore means by
which they can evaluate and improve upon their use of transparency
and public participation.
1. Use Management-Based Strategies to Promote Transparency
and Public Participation
Agencies could be encouraged to develop “Public Participation
Plans” whereby they would establish strategic guidelines on how to
solicit and make better use of public participation in their own regulatory processes. Planning by individual agencies is important because
each agency is a unique administrative environment and a one-sizefits-all approach to transparency and public-participation issues likely
will not be appropriate for all government agencies.
A planning- or management-based approach to agency reform
has already been introduced in other contexts. For example, in an
effort to improve the scientific integrity of regulatory decisionmaking,
OMB issued a bulletin, pursuant to Executive Order 12,866, mandating peer review of “influential scientific information” disseminated by
agencies.73 The bulletin noted that different peer-review mechanisms
are appropriate for different types of information products. Selection
of an appropriate mechanism was left to the discretion of the agencies
because agencies were best situated to weigh the costs and benefits
associated with various types of peer review. The bulletin did, howSee OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, FINAL INQUALITY BULLETIN FOR PEER REVIEW 2 (2004), available at http://www.white
house.gov/omb/memoranda/fy2005/m05-03.pdf.
73

FORMATION
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ever, call for “a transparent process for public disclosure of peer-review planning,” including the establishment of an agenda that
describes the peer-review process that the agency has developed “for
each of its forthcoming influential scientific disseminations.”74
Similarly, each agency’s Public Participation Plan could include
elements identifying goals and core values (for example, the identification and solicitation of systematically underrepresented constituencies), procedures for monitoring and evaluating compliance with the
Plans, and procedures for measuring the effectiveness of the Plans (including efforts at collection of relevant data on levels, quality, and
costs of participation at different points in the regulatory process).
Agencies could develop Plans after some form of public notice and
comment tailored to the unique challenges facing each agency. The
Plans could also be subject to periodic internal review by the agency,
no less often than every five years. Furthermore, agencies could be
encouraged to produce documentation of compliance with their Plans
at regular intervals and should periodically reassess the efficacy of
their Plans.
A management-based approach to public-participation policy reform has the potential to alter the bureaucratic culture within agencies
over the long term. Another advantage of Public Participation Plans
is that internal agency discussions during development of the Plans, as
well as the periodic internal reassessments, might generate information that would help regulatory policymakers learn what strategies for
improvement of public participation work best in their area of regulatory activity. It would also ensure that such plans do not simply sit on
a shelf without impacting agency decisionmaking. Finally, the periodic reviews might yield data that are useful to the agency, to government generally, and to academic researchers interested in
understanding and improving public participation in the administrative process.
Like the peer-review plans called for by the OMB Bulletin, Public Participation Plans would not be focused on specific rules. Rather,
they would reflect agency strategic thinking about ways to engage constructively with the issues of public participation and transparency on
an ongoing basis. These planning processes should themselves be
open and transparent. For example, in 2001, the EPA used an asynchronous online public process to solicit input for its public-participa-

74

Id. at 7.
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tion policy.75 Although the provisions of any Plans that agencies
develop need not be made legally enforceable, nor the Plans themselves judicially reviewable, they could nevertheless be subject to periodic review both by the agency and by an oversight entity, whether in
the Congress, OMB, or the White House.
Recommendation S1. The new administration should encourage agencies to develop “Public Participation Plans” to
assess the quality and diversity of participation in recent
agency decisions and to identify ways to make better use of
public participation and transparency in their rulemaking
processes.
Recommendation S2. Public Participation Plans should be
developed and adopted in a transparent process that involves, at a minimum, some form of public notice and
comment.
Recommendation S3. Public Participation Plans should be
subject to periodic review both by the propounding agency
and by an oversight entity no less often than every five years.
2. Promote Continued Deliberation and Research on Issues of
Transparency and Public Participation in the
Rulemaking Process
The landscape within which agencies operate is not static. New
or amended legislation, administrative policies and priorities of presidential administrations, the ever-expanding potential of information
technology, and a host of other factors all contribute to flux in the
administration of agency rulemaking. Although agencies should internally identify and engage issues relating to transparency and public
participation through the development of Public Participation Plans,
broader study of these issues needs to be conducted by an objective,
nonpartisan body of experts in the field of administrative procedure
implementation and reform. For this reason, the Task Force endorses
the reauthorization and appropriation of funding for ACUS.
From 1968 to 1995, ACUS operated as an independent agency
and advisory committee that studied administrative processes, procedures, and practices for the purpose of recommending improvements
and reforms to Congress and agencies. It drew on the expertise of
75 See generally THOMAS C. BEIERLE, DEMOCRACY ON-LINE: AN EVALUATION OF THE
NATIONAL DIALOGUE ON PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT IN EPA DECISIONS (2002), available at http://
www.rff.org/rff/Documents/RFF-RPT-demonline.pdf (describing and evaluating the
undertaking).
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individuals from government, academia, and the private sector and
over its twenty-eight years of operation issued approximately 200 recommendations and hundreds of reports, articles, papers, and guides,
some with government-wide scope and others that were agency specific. Most of the recommendations were implemented by statutory
enactment or agency action, resulting in significant changes in administrative processes and procedures, including the enactment of the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act,76 the Negotiated Rulemaking
Act,77 the Equal Access to Justice Act,78 and the Congressional Accountability Act.79
ACUS cultivated an internal culture of, and developed a reputation for, high-quality neutral expertise. Recommendations passed
through a meticulous and exacting vetting process before earning the
Conference’s endorsement. This process allowed ACUS to make successful recommendations even in areas of highly charged partisan debate. Additionally, ACUS was widely regarded as a cost-effective
organization. Only the Chair, a small staff, and consultants received
compensation; government officials, prestigious academics, and private-sector experts served on a volunteer basis or for modest stipends.
ACUS was able to use its small appropriations to attract considerable
“in-kind” contributions for its projects. As a result, its studies, publications, and recommendations yielded significant monetary savings
for agencies, practitioners, and private parties.
Despite broad bipartisan support for the work of ACUS, on September 13, 1995, a joint House-Senate conference committee voted to
terminate funding for the Conference.80 The elimination of ACUS resulted in government budgetary savings of only approximately $1.8
million per year,81 at the cost of millions of dollars in potential savings
76 Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-320, 110 Stat. 3870
(codified in scattered sections of 5, 10, 28, 29, 31, and 41 U.S.C.).
77 Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-648, 104 Stat. 4969 (codified at 5
U.S.C. §§ 561–570 (2006)).
78 Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 96-481, 94 Stat. 2325 (1980) (codified in scattered sections of 5, 15, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
79 Congressional Accountability Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-1, 109 Stat. 3 (codified at 2
U.S.C. §§ 1301–1438 (2006)). According to the former Acting Chair of the Conference and
OIRA Administrator, Sally Katzen, over the life of the Administrative Conference, “about
three-fourths of [its] recommendations have been favorably acted on, in whole or in part.” Sally
Katzen, The Role of the Administrative Conference in Improving the Regulatory Process, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 649, 665 (1994) (reproducing testimony taken at congressional hearings regarding reauthorization of ACUS).
80 See Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations Act, Pub. L.
104-52, Title IV, 109 Stat. 468, 480 (1996).
81 See Memorandum from Morton Rosenberg & T.J. Halstead, Cong. Research Serv., to
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at the agency level as the result of implementation of future ACUS
recommendations for administrative reform.82 To make matters
worse, after ACUS was defunded, its recommendations were removed
from the Code of Federal Regulations (“CFR”), where they had previously been published.83 The new administration should either restore all of these recommendations to the CFR or charge a newly
reconstituted and funded ACUS with reviewing its past recommendations to determine which should be republished.
A newly reconstituted and funded ACUS would provide an institutional vehicle for analysis of how to improve both the quality and
legitimacy of agency rulemaking. ACUS’s ongoing attention to these
issues would enhance the government’s ability to learn from pilot programs and other transparency or public-participation reforms to the
rulemaking process. Many of the recommendations of the Task Force,
if implemented, would be promising focal points for ACUS-sponsored
research and program evaluation.
Recommendation S4. The Administrative Conference of the
United States should be reauthorized, adequately funded,
and charged with, among other tasks, evaluating future issues relating to transparency and public participation in the
rulemaking process and issuing recommendations for additional improvements.
3. Engage in Ongoing Analysis to Promote More Effective
Transparency and Public-Participation Policies
The Task Force recognizes the importance of evaluating the impact of administrative innovations and reforms, given the significance
of performance results as a key metric for judging governmental operHon. Chris Cannon, Chairman, House Subcomm. on Commerce and Admin., Comm. on the
Judiciary 2 (Oct. 7, 2004), available at http://www.abanet.org/poladv/documents/acus_crs_7oct04.
pdf (noting that in its last year in existence, ACUS received $1.8 million in appropriations).
82 Implementation of ACUS recommendations often resulted in significant savings at the
agency level. For example, in its final years, ACUS spearheaded the use of alternative dispute
resolution techniques in agency litigation. According to Katzen’s estimates,
[t]he FDIC, relying on ACUS recommendations, began a pilot mediation program
that saved more than 9 million dollars in legal fees and expenses during the first
eighteen months. A pilot project by the Department of Labor, on which ACUS has
worked closely . . . reduced the cost of litigation in cases resolved by mediation by
seventeen percent and expedited resolution of disputes by six months, or more than
sixty percent.
Katzen, supra note 79, at 659.
83 However, ACUS recommendations are now available online. See, e.g., Florida State
University College of Law, Recommendations of the Administrative Conference of the United
States, http://www.law.fsu.edu/library/admin/acus/acustoc.html (last visited May 8, 2009).
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ations. As the new administration implements administrative reforms,
it should take care to do so in ways that facilitate, to the greatest extent possible, empirical evaluation of their impacts. Administrative
reforms are often adopted and implemented in a manner that frustrates attempts to measure their real impact and efficacy. Under typical conditions, it is difficult for agencies or government oversight and
research bodies to determine whether an implemented reform is
achieving its intended aims.
It is imperative that researchers and observers, both within the
government and within the public, be able to assess causal relationships between reform and result. At the same time that reforms are
proposed, government agencies should consider what would be the
best means of evaluating the impact of these reforms. How will the
agency be able to decide at a later time if its reforms have been effective? After reforms are implemented, evaluation research must be
conducted to determine what reforms actually work. If reforms do
work, evaluation research should help explain why; if they do not
work, research should help explain why not. A reauthorized ACUS
would be well situated to conduct such analysis and to issue recommendations for further improvements based on its findings. In addition, agencies themselves or outside researchers could conduct the
analyses.
Recommendation S5. The federal government should encourage empirical evaluation of the impact of any innovation
or reform of agency transparency and public-participation
policies. Agencies should therefore consider the best means
of evaluating the impact of reforms before implementing
changes to agency practice or policy.
Recommendation S6. Ex post evaluation and analysis of empirical data on transparency and public-participation reforms
should be conducted by a combination of a reauthorized Administrative Conference of the United States, agencies themselves, and outside academic researchers.
Conclusion
Transparency and public participation serve the goals of procedural legitimacy and substantive quality in agency rulemaking. This Article has identified ways that the rulemaking process can be reformed
to meet these goals most effectively, whether through new experimentation or through improvements in initiatives already underway. Ultimately, transparency and public-participation reforms have the
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potential to benefit both administrative agencies and the public at
large. Greater participation can yield information that will help agencies better fulfill their statutory mandates, while society will benefit
from substantively superior rules as well as a regulatory process with
enhanced legitimacy. Improved transparency allows for more effective and useful participation while simultaneously establishing public
oversight as a check on agency behavior.
The Task Force on Transparency and Public Participation recognizes that, although there have been some recent improvements in the
area of transparency and public participation in rulemaking, other significant challenges remain. Public participation is often limited during
the crucial stages of pre-NPRM policy development; agency communications with external actors are often discouraged or avoided; and the
public does not always have ready access to the information that
would allow for effective participation. If adopted, the recommendations discussed in this Article would go a long way toward improving
the quality of agency rulemaking and enhancing its public legitimacy.
The Task Force’s recommendations represent priorities that the
new administration should seriously consider, but they are not an exclusive set of options for constructive engagement with the challenges
associated with agency rulemaking. Nor should the new administration lose sight of the overarching goals that transparency and public
participation serve. The Task Force believes its recommendations are
important for the quality and legitimacy of government regulation, but
regardless of whether all of the recommendations in this Article are
adopted, the importance of government regulation in our society
means that the new administration must take serious, affirmative steps
to renew our commitment to a legitimate rulemaking process that
yields high-quality regulatory decisions.
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APPENDIX 1:
Task Force Recommendations
Transparency Recommendations
Recommendation T1. Agencies should streamline the FOIA
request process by publishing electronically not only (i) the
records that FOIA requires an agency to release without first
receiving a request, but also (ii) any documents that an
agency or court has previously determined not to fall within
a FOIA exemption.
• These efforts could include controlled experimentation with (i) a document-management system that would
involve agencies applying a FOIA classification to each
document at the time of creation and releasing all documents for which there is no claimed exemption, or (ii)
online document repositories.
Recommendation T2. Agencies should adapt, as government-wide best practices for docket-related transparency,
the requirements of Clean Air Act § 307 that call for
promptly including in each rule’s docket, among other
records, all communications with OMB and other documents
of “central relevance.”
Recommendation T3. The new administration should improve the e-rulemaking system by focusing on (i) the ease of
access and usability of the Regulations.gov Web site, (ii) the
quality of data being uploaded, and (iii) the timeliness of
agency data entry into the Federal Docket Management
System.
Recommendation T4. Individual agencies should improve
search capabilities on their own Web sites and, for significant
rulemakings, create pages that hyperlink to Regulations.gov.
Recommendation T5. Agencies should create online FOIA
document libraries that allow the public to search and access
documents that the agency or a court has determined not to
be exempt from FOIA disclosure.
Recommendation T6. Agencies should create a procedure
by which public interest groups can qualify for a standing
FOIA fee exemption.
Recommendation T7. The Office of Government Information Services should be located in the National Archives and
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Records Administration and should be tasked with overseeing FOIA reforms.
Recommendation T8. Agencies should take necessary steps
to ensure streamlined, independent, and expedited reviews
of whistleblower-retaliation claims.
Recommendation T9. The adjudication of whistleblowerprotection claims should be governed by an “objective reasonableness” standard without a presumption of nonretaliation by the government.
Recommendation T10. Congress should confirm that the
Lloyd-La Follette Act covers government whistleblowers
that go to Congress with information.
Recommendation T11. The implementation of any new
whistleblower-protection policies passed by Congress should
be carefully monitored by a government-wide entity that is
independent from regulatory agencies.
Public Participation Recommendations
Recommendation P1. The new administration should encourage agencies to experiment with interactive comment
processes.
Recommendation P2. Pilot programs implementing interactive comment periods should be designed to facilitate collection of empirical data concerning the impact and efficiency
of such processes, with the eventual goal of making recommendations about any permanent changes to the comment
process.
Recommendation P3. The new administration should strive
to create an agency culture in which administrators understand that it is good practice to communicate with external
actors, so long as communications that have an impact on the
development of a proposed rule are disclosed in agency
dockets.
• Significant communications with external actors
should be documented even when those contacts occur
prior to the issuance of a notice of proposed rulemaking.
• Such disclosures need not be extremely detailed but
should contain information as to the identity and affiliation of the parties to the communication, as well as the
general topics discussed.
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Recommendation P4. The standards governing communications with external actors should be expressly clarified to reduce confusion among administrators as to which
communications are proscribed and which should be
encouraged.
Recommendation P5. Agencies should be encouraged to
take affirmative steps to ensure that more external interest
groups are given an opportunity to participate meaningfully
in the early stages of a rulemaking.
• At a minimum, agencies should maintain an “open
door” policy, whereby agencies make themselves available for contact to all interest groups in an even-handed
manner.
• Alternatively, agencies should be encouraged to
adopt other mechanisms to ensure broad-based public
involvement.
Recommendation P6. Agencies should announce areas of
prospective rulemaking as early as possible and take steps to
involve all affected interests in the process of developing new
rules.
Recommendation P7. Procedural barriers to agency use of
advisory committees should be reduced, and agencies should
be encouraged to form advisory committees whenever useful
and appropriate.
Recommendation P8. The new administration should clarify
and amplify the Federal Advisory Committee Act’s requirement that advisory committees be “fairly balanced” and
should encourage agencies to adhere to existing standards to
ensure representation of diverse perspectives on advisory
committees.
Recommendation P9. The impact of conflict- or balance-ofinterest rules and public meeting requirements may appropriately vary depending on the nature of the committee. It
may be important for expert advisory committees to require
a balance of scientific positions as opposed to interests, and
to provide for nonpublic deliberations of certain expert
committees.
Strategic Management Recommendations
Recommendation S1. The new administration should encourage agencies to develop “Public Participation Plans” to
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assess the quality and diversity of participation in recent
agency decisions and to identify ways to make better use of
public participation and transparency in their rulemaking
processes.
Recommendation S2. Public Participation Plans should be
developed and adopted in a transparent process that involves, at a minimum, some form of public notice and
comment.
Recommendation S3. Public Participation Plans should be
subject to periodic review both by the propounding agency
and by an oversight entity no less often than every five years.
Recommendation S4. The Administrative Conference of the
United States should be reauthorized, adequately funded,
and charged with, among other tasks, evaluating future issues relating to transparency and public participation in the
rulemaking process and issuing recommendations for additional improvements.
Recommendation S5. The federal government should encourage empirical evaluation of the impact of any innovation
or reform of agency transparency and public-participation
policies. Agencies should therefore consider the best means
of evaluating the impact of reforms before implementing
changes to agency practice or policy.
Recommendation S6. Ex post evaluation and analysis of empirical data on transparency and public-participation reforms
should be conducted by a combination of a reauthorized Administrative Conference of the United States, agencies themselves, and outside academic researchers.
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APPENDIX 2:
Task Force Member Biographies
Cary Coglianese (Task Force Chair) is the Associate Dean for
Academic Affairs and the Edward B. Shils Professor of Law and Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania, where he
also is director of the Penn Program on Regulation. The author of
numerous articles and books on administrative law and regulatory
policy, he spent a dozen years on the faculty at Harvard University’s
John F. Kennedy School of Government and has been a visiting professor of law at Stanford University and Vanderbilt University. He is
the founder and chair of the Law & Society Association’s collaborative research network on regulatory governance, a council member of
the American Bar Association’s Section of Administrative Law and
Regulatory Practice, and a founding editor of the journal Regulation
& Governance.
Steven J. Balla is Associate Professor of Political Science, Public
Policy and Public Administration, and International Affairs at The
George Washington University, where he also serves as a Research
Associate in the George Washington Institute of Public Policy. He is a
member of the International Working Group on Online Consultation
and Public Policy Making. During the 2008–2009 academic year, he
was Fulbright Scholar at the Peking University School of Government. He is author, along with William T. Gormley, Jr., of Bureaucracy and Democracy: Accountability and Performance.
Barbara H. Brandon serves as Faculty Services Librarian at the
University of Miami School of Law. She has practiced environmental
law at both the federal and state levels for the U.S. Department of
Justice, the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection,
and a large national law firm; she has also served as a policy analyst
for the nonprofit organization Information Renaissance. She has
taught law at the University of Kentucky College of Law and has
served as an adjunct professor at the University of Pittsburgh School
of Law. She is currently a member of the American Bar Association’s
Committee on the Status and Future of Federal E-Rulemaking. She
holds a J.D. from the University of Pittsburgh School of Law and an
LL.M. from Harvard Law School.
Ashley Brown is the Executive Director of the Harvard Electricity Policy Group (“HEPG”), a program of the Mossavar-Rahmani
Center for Business and Government at Harvard University’s John F.
Kennedy School of Government. He is of counsel to the law firm of
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Dewey & LeBoeuf LLP. He has also served as an advisor on infrastructure regulatory issues to the governments of Brazil, Tanzania, India, Ukraine, Russia, Philippines, Zambia, Namibia, Argentina, Costa
Rica, and Hungary. From 1983–1993, he served as Commissioner of
the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio. Prior to his appointment, he
was the coordinator and counsel for the Montgomery County [Ohio]
Fair Housing Center, managing attorney for the Legal Aid Society of
Dayton, Inc., and legal advisor to the Miami Valley Regional Planning
Commission, also in Dayton. He has taught in public schools and universities, frequently lectures at universities and conferences throughout the world, and publishes articles on subjects of interest to
American and foreign electricity sectors.
Louis Clark is president and corporate accountability director of
the Government Accountability Project (“GAP”) in Washington,
D.C. GAP promotes accountability by advocating occupational free
speech, litigating whistleblower cases, investigating and publicizing
whistleblower concerns, and developing reforms of whistleblower laws
and policies. GAP also conducts an accredited legal clinic for law students. Clark assumed directorship of GAP in 1978, having first served
as legal counsel for the organization. He is a frequent contributor of
articles on free speech and also has served as an adjunct professor at
the Antioch University School of Law from 1978–1988 and the David
E. Clarke School of Law since 1989.
Thomas Cmar is an attorney for the Natural Resources Defense
Council (“NRDC”), where he litigates cases under FOIA and federal
environmental laws. Prior to joining NRDC, he was an attorney for
the International Labor Rights Fund and a law clerk to the Honorable
Debra Freeman, U.S. Magistrate Judge in the Southern District of
New York.
Jamie Conrad is the principal of Conrad Law & Policy Counsel,
where he represents businesses, associations, and coalitions before
agencies and Congress in the areas of homeland security; environment, health, and safety; and science policy/information quality. He
practiced previously at the American Chemistry Council and at two
major national law firms. He has chaired the Environmental Policy
Commission for the City of Alexandria, Virginia, and was one of the
few Democrats on the Bush-Cheney Transition Advisory Committee
for the EPA. He is the Secretary of the ABA’s Section of Administrative Law & Regulatory Practice.
E. Donald Elliott is a partner at Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP
and chairs the firm’s worldwide Environmental, Health and Safety
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Department. From 1989 through 1991, he served as General Counsel
of the EPA. He was a professor at Yale Law School from 1981
through 1993 and continues to teach environmental law, administrative law, and complex civil litigation as an adjunct professor at Yale.
He is a member of the National Academy of Sciences Board on Environmental Studies and Toxicology and of the advisory boards for the
Center for Clean Air Policy, the Environment Reporter, the Journal of
Industrial Ecology, and the Carnegie Mellon University Center for the
Study and Improvement of Regulation.
Fred Emery is a principal in The Regulatory Group, Inc., a small
consulting firm that specializes in federal regulations and the regulatory process. He has worked in the regulatory field for almost fifty
years at both the state and federal levels. Mr. Emery served as Director of the Federal Register from 1970 to 1979 where he received national attention for his efforts to make federal regulations more
readable. He has taught administrative law at the law school level,
taught the rulemaking process to employees at most federal regulatory agencies, and is a Fellow of the ABA Section of Administrative
Law and Regulatory Practice.
William Funk is a professor and the Jeffrey Bain Faculty Scholar
at Lewis & Clark Law School. Prior to becoming a professor, he was
an assistant general counsel at the U.S. Department of Energy, the
principal staff member of the Legislation Subcommittee of the U.S.
House of Representatives’ Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and a staff attorney in the Office of Legal Counsel for the U.S.
Department of Justice. Funk has co-authored Administrative Procedure and Practice: Problems and Cases, Administrative Law: Examples
& Explanations, the Federal Administrative Procedure Sourcebook,
and Legal Protection of the Environment.
Beth Noveck is a professor of law at the New York Law School,
where she is also the Director of the Institute for Information Law
and Policy and of the Democracy Design Workshop, the latter of
which focuses on fostering open, transparent, and collaborative ways
of learning, working, and governing. In collaboration with the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office, Noveck launched the Peer to Patent:
Community Patent Review Project. She authors The Cairns Blog on
e-democracy, cyber democracy, and civic innovation.
Stuart Shapiro is an assistant professor at the Edward J. Bloustein
School of Planning and Public Policy at Rutgers University. He has
written on the public comment process, e-rulemaking, and other aspects of the rulemaking process. Prior to joining Rutgers, he worked
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for five years as a desk officer and manager at the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs within the Office of Management and
Budget, analyzing and coordinating review in the areas of labor,
health, and social policy. He received his Ph.D. from Harvard University and has taught at Harvard University, Georgetown University,
and the USDA Graduate School.
Dan Turner is the President of Turner Consulting Group, Inc. He
started the company in 1994, drawing on his background in government computing services and state networking agencies. TCG has developed award-winning websites for several divisions of the National
Institutes of Health, the National Science Foundation, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the Department of Justice, and for private
industry, as well as associations, educational institutions and small
businesses. Turner serves on the board of the Entrepreneurs’ Organization’s Washington, D.C., Chapter and organizes and travels extensively to EO events worldwide. He is a member of the Association of
Computing Machinery.
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APPENDIX 3:
Related ACUS Recommendations
During its operation from 1968 to 1995, the Administrative Conference of the United States issued many recommendations related to
transparency and public participation in the regulatory process.
305.71-2 Principles and Guidelines for Implementation of the Freedom of Information Act (Recommendation No. 71-2), available
at http://www.law.fsu.edu/library/admin/acus/305712.html
305.72-8 Adverse Actions Against Federal Employees (Recommendation No. 72-8), available at http://www.law.fsu.edu/library/admin/
acus/305728.html
305.76-2 Strengthening the Informational and Notice-Giving Functions of the “Federal Register” (Recommendation No. 76-2),
available at http://www.law.fsu.edu/library/admin/acus/305762.
html
305.76-3 Procedures in Addition to Notice and the Opportunity for
Comment in Informal Rulemaking (Recommendation No. 76-3),
available at http://www.law.fsu.edu/library/admin/acus/305763.
html
305.77-3 Ex parte Communications in Informal Rulemaking Proceedings (Recommendation No. 77-3), available at http://www.law.fsu.
edu/library/admin/acus/305773.html
305.80-6 Intragovernmental Communications in Informal Rulemaking
Proceedings (Recommendation No. 80-6), available at http://
www.law.fsu.edu/library/admin/acus/305806.html
305.81-1 Procedures for Assessing and Collecting Freedom of Information Act fees (Recommendation No. 81-1), available at http://
www.law.fsu.edu/library/admin/acus/305811.html
305.82-4 Procedures for Negotiating Proposed Regulations (Recommendation No. 82-4), available at http://www.law.fsu.edu/library/
admin/acus/305824.html
305.84-3 Improvements in the Administration of the Government in
the Sunshine Act (Recommendation No. 84-3), available at http://
www.law.fsu.edu/library/admin/acus/305843.html
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305.87-2 Federal protection of private sector health and safety
whistleblowers (Recommendation No. 87-2), available at http://
www.law.fsu.edu/library/admin/acus/305872.html
305.88-9 Presidential review of agency rulemaking (Recommendation
No. 88-9), available at http://www.law.fsu.edu/library/admin/acus/
305889.html
305.89-3 Conflict-of-interest requirements for Federal Advisory Committees (Recommendation No. 89-3), available at http://www.law.
fsu.edu/library/admin/acus/305893.html
305.90-2 The Ombudsman in Federal Agencies (Recommendation No.
90-2), available at http://www.law.fsu.edu/library/admin/acus/305
902.html
305.93-4 Improving the Environment for Agency Rulemaking (Recommendation No. 93-4), available at http://www.law.fsu.edu/
library/admin/acus/305934.html

